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I
nterchange fees are an integral part of the pricing structure of credit
and debit card industries. While in recent years the theoretical liter-
ature on interchange fees, and payment cards in general, has grown
rapidly, the empirical literature has not. There are several reasons for
this. First, comprehensive data are hard to obtain. Second, the industries
are very complicated, and empirical models need to incorporate many
industry-specific features, such as payment-card network rules and gov-
ernment regulations. And third, empirical studies may require a
generalized empirical model since, typically, only a few payment card
networks exist in a given country. However, because of the first and
second reasons, generalizing empirical models may prove problematic. 
This article seeks to provide a bridge between the theoretical and
empirical literatures on interchange fees. Specifically, the article con-
fronts theory with practice by asking: To what extent do existing models
of interchange fees match up with actual interchange fee practices in
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75various countries? For each of three key countries—Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States—models that “best” fit the
competitive and institutional features of that country’s payment card
market are identified, and the implications of those models are com-
pared to actual practices. Along what competitive dimensions is there
alignment? Along what competitive dimensions is there not alignment?
What country-specific factors appear to be important in explaining
deviations from theoretical predictions? The results suggest that a
theory applicable in one country may not be applicable in another and
that similar interchange fee arrangements and regulations may well have
different implications in different countries.
The first section of the article briefly describes the mechanics of
interchange fees. The second section surveys existing theories of inter-
change fees. The discussion focuses on assumptions regarding the
degree of network competition, the degree of intranetwork (issuing and
acquiring) competition, and the behavior of consumers and merchants.
The third section attempts to match the theory with practice by exam-
ining in some detail interchange fee developments in the three
countries. These case studies provide useful insight into interchange fee
competition issues.
I. MECHANICS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
Credit and debit card industries are examples of two-sided markets.
The distinguishing feature of two-sided markets is that they contain
two sets of end users, each of whom needs the other for the market to
operate. In the case of credit and debit cards, the two end-user groups
are cardholders and merchants. 
Payment card systems take one of two principal forms. They may
be three-party systems: cardholders, merchants, and a single financial
institution that offers proprietary network services, for example, Ameri-
can Express. Alternatively, they may be four-party systems: cardholders,
merchants, card issuing banks, and merchant acquiring banks, using the
services of a multiparty network such as MasterCard, Visa, or a domes-
tic debit card network. In four-party systems, the interchange fee is an
instrument that networks can use to achieve a desired balance of 
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cardholder usage versus merchant acceptance across the two sides of the
market, in the same way that proprietary systems can achieve directly.
In other words, interchange fees are a mechanism that can be used to
transfer revenues from one side of the market to the other to generate
the desired level of card activity. 
In most cases, interchange fees are paid by the merchant acquiring
bank to card issuing banks.
1 Typically interchange fees are a component
of a larger set of fees charged by merchant acquiring banks and there-
fore are indirectly paid by merchants.
Interchange fees are set under a variety of arrangements. In some
networks, they are collectively set by the members of the network; while
in others they are set by network management. In some countries, they
are subject to regulatory limits.
2 Network rules, which likely affect the
level of interchange fees, also exhibit considerable variation across coun-
tries. These rules include no-surcharge rules, HAC rules, and net issuer
rules. No-surcharge rules prevent merchants from charging customers
for the use of the network’s card. Honor-all-card rules require mer-
chants to accept the network’s branded card regardless of the issuer.
3 Net
issuer rules require merchant acquiring banks to issue a minimum level
of cards in order to participate on the acquiring side of the market. 
II. INTERCHANGE FEE THEORIES
Interchange fees and related payment card issues have been the
subject of a growing body of theoretical work in recent years.
4 This
section surveys a portion of this work, focusing on models that examine
various factors potentially affecting interchange fees. To review this lit-
erature somewhat systematically, we group possible factors into four
categories: assumptions regarding networks, assumptions regarding
issuers and acquirers, assumptions regarding end users (consumers and
merchants), and assumptions regarding other possible factors. A single
factor, by itself, is highly unlikely to determine the level of interchange
fees. Rather, interaction among factors, in some or all of these four cat-
egories, typically proves critical.
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Assumptions 
Table 1 presents a summary of many of the key theoretical articles
on interchange fees written over the last several years. The papers,
organized by the assumed level of network and intranetwork (issuer and
acquirer) competition, are listed in the third column of the table. As
will be discussed in the third section, use of these two categories proves
to be a useful “first-step” sorting mechanism when comparing model
assumptions and predictions with actual interchange fee arrangements.
The first organizational division, reflected in the first column of
Table 1, is the assumption regarding network competition. Many
models assume there is no competition among card networks, either
explicitly, by assuming a monopolistic network, or implicitly, by not
considering network competition in the setup. Other models assume
there is competition among networks. In some cases, these networks are
defined as identical, competing within the same payment instrument
(for example, credit vs. credit or debit vs. debit). In other cases, these
networks are defined as asymmetric, competing across different
payment instruments (for example, credit vs. debit or PIN debit vs. sig-
nature debit), across different network schemes (three-party vs.
four-party), or within the same payment instrument but facing differ-
ent cost structures.
The second organizational division, shown in the second column of
Table 1, is the assumption regarding intranetwork competition. A key
feature of most models is the assumed degree of competition among
card issuing banks and among merchant acquiring banks. This degree
of competition is typically modeled with reference to the price-cost
margins of issuers and acquirers. A zero margin is taken to imply perfect
competition. A positive margin is taken to imply some market power.
As seen in Table 1, some models assume both issuers and acquirers
operate in perfectly competitive markets, some assume both issuers and
acquirers have some market power, and still others assume only issuers
have market power.
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The remaining “Assumption” columns in Table 1 list other important
factors assumed or incorporated in the respective models. Column 4
focuses on network attributes. In addition to the assumed degree of
network competition, three additional network attributes are considered:
whether the model in question assumes a three-party or four-party
scheme; what the objectives of the networks are; and whether there is a
single or multiple interchange fee structure. Possible network objectives
include maximizing the number of transactions or market share; maximiz-
ing network profits (in a three-party scheme); and maximizing members’
joint profits (in a four-party scheme), perhaps weighted more on the issuer
or acquirer side. In addition, networks may seek to address any imbalances
between the costs and revenues of issuers and acquirers, and between the
demand of consumers and merchants. Finally, models may incorporate
either a single interchange fee or, alternatively, multiple interchange fees
that vary according to type of industry or transaction volume.
Column 5 focuses on intranetwork attributes. In addition to the
assumed degree of competition on the issuing and acquiring sides of the
market, three additional attributes are considered: the degree of pass-
through of interchange fees from issuers and acquirers to cardholders
and merchants, respectively; the relative cost structures facing issuers
and acquirers; and whether issuers and acquirers are the same or 
different entities.
The next two columns turn to assumptions regarding the end users
in payment card models. Consumer characteristics (column 6) include
the demand for products (elastic or inelastic); the demand for cards
(exogenous or endogenous; singlehoming or multihoming); and the
demand for specific card transactions (homogeneous or heterogeneous
transactional benefits). The types of fees and rewards that consumers
face also vary by model.
Merchant characteristics are listed in column 7. Some models
assume that merchants are strategic in their card-acceptance behavior—
that is, they are competitive. Others assume that merchants are
monopolistic. Models also differ according to whether merchants are
assumed to derive homogeneous or heterogeneous transactional bene-
fits, and whether they pay per-transaction fees and/or fixed fees. Finally,
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among them are the presence or absence of assorted network rules and
bylaws. These include no-surcharge and nondiscrimination rules, HAC
rules, and net issuer rules.
Results
It is probably fair to say that the results of the papers summarized in
Table 1 vary as much or more as the underlying assumptions in these
papers. Key results are listed in column 9.
Perhaps the most important general result involves network compe-
tition. The effect of network competition on interchange fees is not
uniform but varies widely depending on other factors. Some key factors
include consumer and merchant demand characteristics, and the nature
of intrasystem competition.
To the extent consumers are singlehoming, that is, using only one
payment card, networks can act as monopolies. Thus, interchange fees
are not reduced by network competition (Rochet and Tirole 2002).
However, as consumers become multihoming, merchant resistance to
interchange fees increases, and network competition lowers interchange
fees (Rochet and Tirole 2002, 2003; Guthrie and Wright 2003).
To the extent that merchants are homogeneous, with an inelastic
demand for transactions, network competition leads to a lower (or
equal) interchange fee than noncompetition. However, if merchants are
heterogeneous (elastic demand), the competitive interchange fee can be
higher than the monopolistic interchange fee (Guthrie and Wright
2006). Network competition lowers interchange fees for both strategic
(competitive) and monopolistic merchants. However, interchange fees
for monopolistic merchants are lower than those for strategic merchants
whether the network is competitive or not (Guthrie and Wright 2003).
Intrasystem competition is similarly influential. Several models
show that differences in issuers’ and acquirers’ margins affect equilib-
rium interchange fees (Manenti and Somma 2002; Rochet and Tirole
2002; and Guthrie and Wright 2006). Differences in these margins also
affect competing networks’ profits (Manenti and Somma 2002).
A number of other interesting results involving network competi-
tion fallout of these models as well. These include: (1) network
competition lowers the total fees charged across the issuing and 
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acquiring sides of the market (Rochet and Tirole 2003; and Chakravorti
and Roson 2006); (2) network competition may raise interchange fees
if consumers hold a single card and merchant demand for transactions
is elastic (Guthrie and Wright 2003, 2006); and (3) if the network is a
monopoly, interchange fees can vary depending on the interaction of
network objectives and issuer and acquirer margins (Gans and King
2002; Schmalensee 2002; Wright 2003, 2004; and Schwartz and
Vincent 2006). 
Clearly, the nature of network competition is central to many of the
results of the models in Table 1. Another important role is played by the
various network rules and bylaws. Most of the models, for example,
explicitly assume a no-surcharge rule and implicitly assume an honor all
cards rule. Relaxing these assumptions can lead to differing results. If
merchants are allowed to surcharge, for example, interchange fee levels
may change depending on any number of additional factors, including
the effective cost of surcharging to merchants, merchant competitive-
ness, and the price elasticity of consumer demand for goods (Gans and
King 2002; Katz 2001; Wright 2003; and Schwartz and Vincent 2006).
What one comes away with after surveying this rich theoretical lit-
erature is an appreciation for the many factors that may affect
interchange fees. Even a single factor may impact interchange fees dif-
ferently, depending on other factors. Determining the actual impact of
such variables is, in the end, an empirical question. We attempt to take
a step in this direction in the next section.
III. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
The previous section surveyed some of the important contributions
in the theoretical literature on payment card interchange fees. This
section details actual market conditions in three countries—the United
States, Australia, and the UK—and compares these conditions with
theory. Interchange fees have been a focus of much debate in these three
countries in recent years. The key question asked is: To what extent do
actual interchange fee practices “line up” with model assumptions and
predictions? For each country, we first characterize the credit and debit
card industries by the level of network and intranetwork competition.
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We then try to match a country’s experience with existing theory, sug-
gesting additional assumptions and institutional features that may help
explain that country’s situation.
United States
Network competition exists in the United States, both within and
across payment card instruments.
The United States has six credit card networks. The three largest—
Visa, MasterCard, and American Express—compete aggressively with
one another. Visa has the largest market share, followed by MasterCard
and American Express. Visa’s market share has declined somewhat in
recent years, as measured by purchase value, number of transactions,
and number of cards (Chart 1). The remaining three credit card net-
works—Discover, Diners Club, and JCB—have relatively small market
shares (Chart 1).
The United States has two signature-based debit card networks
(Visa Check Card and MasterCard MasterMoney) and 13 PIN-based
debit card networks. Competition has been especially pronounced in
Chart 1
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the PIN debit market, especially among the four largest networks. The
market share of Visa’s Interlink network has trended up in recent years,
while those for Star, NYCE, and Pulse have fluctuated (Chart 2). These
large PIN-based networks also compete vigorously with the two signa-
ture-based networks.
5
It is unclear to what extent credit and debit cards compete. Overall
debit card market share (signature plus PIN) has been rising in recent
years, and, in 2003, the number of debit card transactions exceeded the
number of credit card transactions for the first time (Chart 3).
However, in terms of purchase value, the difference between credit and
debit cards has been stable over the last five years, suggesting perhaps
that debit card transactions are largely substituting for paper-based
(check and cash) transactions and not for credit card transactions
(Chart 3). One can safely say, however, that there is competition within
the credit card industry, within the PIN debit card industry, and across
the PIN and signature debit card industries.
Chart 2
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Intranetwork competition also exists in the United States, as both the
acquiring and issuing sides of the card market appear to be competitive.
With regard to the acquiring market, although the largest acquirers’
market share has increased slightly in the last ten years, acquirers’
margins per transaction reportedly have been declining (Chart 4).
6
Chart 3
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On the issuing side, top credit card issuers’ market shares have
increased significantly in the last ten years (Chart 5). Nevertheless, this
market appears to be quite competitive. No annual fees, generous
reward programs, and free or low introductory interest rates are typical
in the industry, as issuers compete aggressively for customers. The story
is somewhat different with respect to debit cards. Here, market shares of
top issuers are much smaller than in the credit card market, but the
degree of competition is hard to gauge (Charts 6 and 7). Because debit
cards are tied to demand deposit accounts, it is costly for consumers to
switch issuers. At the same time, however, many banks use their debit
products as a strategic tool, providing rewards for signature card trans-
actions and charging so-called PIN fees for PIN card transactions. On
net, it is probably fair to view card issuing—both credit and debit—as a
competitive environment.
Matching theory and practice. As noted earlier, both network and
intranetwork payment card competition exist in the United States. In
terms of network competition, competition between Visa and Master-
Card in the credit card market, and among the top networks in the PIN
Chart 4
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Chart 5
U.S. CREDIT CARD ISSUING MARKET 
MARKET SHARE OF TOP ISSUERS
Chart 6
U.S. SIGNATURE DEBIT CARD ISSUING MARKET 
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Chart 7
U.S. PIN DEBIT CARD ISSUING MARKET 
MARKET SHARE OF TOP ISSUERS
Chart 8
U.S. SIGNATURE-BASED CARD ACQUIRING MARKET 
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debit market, fits well with the identical four-party network schemes
assumed in Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006) and Rochet and Tirole
(2002, 2003). Competition between Visa/MasterCard and American
Express, on the other hand, fits well with Manenti and Somma (2002).
In terms of intranetwork competition, although both the acquiring
and issuing sides of the market are competitive, it is difficult to judge
which side is more competitive or which side experiences lower margins
per transaction. Revenues (not margins) are much higher for issuers
than acquirers, but their costs per transaction are unknown. It does
appear that pass-through of interchange fees is 100 percent on the
acquiring side, while on the issuing side it is less than 100 percent.
7, 
8
On balance, network objectives are likely to be weighted more
heavily toward issuers than acquirers in the United States. One reason is
that even the largest nonbank acquirers do not have voting power in
association networks and market share of nonbank acquirers is fairly
large (Chart 8). A second reason is that large bank acquirers are typi-
cally large issuers as well. Therefore, maximization of issuer profits,
number of transactions, and the weighted sum of end-user surplus with
a high weight on consumers appear to be plausible assumptions in the
U.S. case. These assumptions are made by Guthrie and Wright (2003,
2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003).
Other important factors in the United States are merchant demand
for card transactions and consumer cardholding behavior. Most indus-
tries in the United States are quite competitive. As a result, merchants
clearly have a strategic motive to accept cards. In addition, unlike in
most other countries, interchange fees in the United States are set in a
very detailed manner according to industry category and size of the
merchant (Table 2). Thus, a single interchange fee applies to a relatively
homogeneous set of merchants, and this industry-specific fee less likely
impacts consumer cardholding behavior, which is consistent with
Rochet and Tirole (2002). U.S. households typically hold multiple
credit and debit cards—that is, they are multihoming.
9 However, also
consistent with Rochet and Tirole (2002), these multihoming cardhold-
ers often appear to prefer a particular card over the others.
10
Taken in sum, the assumptions in Rochet and Tirole (2002) fit the
U.S. payment card market well. However, the model does not predict
that network competition raises interchange fees, which, arguably, is
 occurring in the United States. The model also predicts that competition
among issuers lowers interchange fees, which also seems to contradict the
U.S. case.
11 The only model that predicts that network competition may
raise interchange fees is Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006). However, to
generate this result, the model assumes that the same interchange fee is
charged to different types of merchants. This assumption does not nec-
essarily fit well with the case in the United States, where interchange fees
vary by industry and size of the merchant.
Can theory and fact be reconciled? Additional considerations may
help explain the U.S. situation. For example, modeling issuers’ behavior
may prove critical. Oligopolistic issuers may alter their card portfolio, if
not change networks, according to profitability. Network competition,
Visa MasterCard Star
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Table 2
U.S. INTERCHANGE CATEGORY BY SELECTED BRAND
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therefore, gives networks a strong incentive to try to attract issuers as
much as possible. One of the strategies for doing so is to provide issuers
with higher interchange fees. these fees allow issuers either to generate
higher revenue per transaction or to provide the issuers’ customers more
generous rewards or both. By offering rewards, issuers may be able to
stimulate their existing customers’ spending on their cards or to lure
customers away from their rival issuers. It is very likely that an issuer
and its rival issuers are members of the same network. Then, higher
interchange fees may not necessarily increase the its total transaction
volume or the network’s (weighted) member joint profits.
If cardholders’ rewards are not just money transfers from merchants
(or their customers) to cardholders but incur additional costs on issuers,
the issuers’ per transaction costs may not be fixed, as many papers
assume.
12 Rather, they depend on whether the cardholder per transac-
tion fees are negative (which means issuers provide rewards) or
non-negative. Whether the cardholder per transaction fees are negative
may greatly depend on the level of interchange fees.
As noted, U.S. interchange fees are set by industry. As a result,
modeling consumer cardholding and merchant card acceptance under a
single interchange fee does not fit the U.S. case. In a given industry,
perhaps the merchant’s card acceptance does not influence its cus-
tomers’ cardholding behavior.
Australia
Network competition likely exists in Australia.
There are six credit card networks in the country. The three
largest—Visa, MasterCard, and Bankcard—have a combined market
share in excess of 80 percent. The remaining market is divided among
American Express, Diners Club, and JCB. Individual network share
data are not available for recent years, but in 2001-02, shares in terms of
number of credit cards were 53.4 percent for Visa, 22.7 percent for
MasterCard, 15.4 percent for Bankcard, 6.5 percent for American
Express, 1.9 percent for Diners, and essentially negligible for JCB.
From 2002 to 2005, the combined American Express/Diners share has
increased slightly (Chart 9).
 There are two debit card networks in Australia, EFTPOS and Visa
Debit. EFTPOS is PIN-based, while Visa Debit is signature-based.
Based on statistics furnished by the Building Society to the Reserve
Bank of Australia, EFTPOS share of the overall debit network is
roughly 90 percent, while Visa Debit’s is roughly 10 percent.
13 Visa
Debit cards are primarily issued by credit unions and building societies
that were precluded from issuing credit cards. EFTPOS cards, in con-
trast, are issued by all types of financial institutions.
Credit card and EFTPOS debit card transactions have exhibited an
interesting growth pattern in recent years (Chart 10). In 1995, credit
and EFTPOS debit transaction volumes were about the same. From
1996 to 1998, debit volume exceeded credit volume, but, from 1999 to
2004, credit volume exceeded debit volume. In 2005, volume for the
two instruments has essentially been the same again. This may imply
that, in Australia, credit and EFTPOS debit are relatively close substi-
tutes, and hence credit card networks and the EFTPOS network see
each other as competitors.
98 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 9















2002 2003 2004 2005
BC, MC, V Amex, Diners
Note: Purchase transactions are the first half of each year.
Source: Reserve Bank of AustraliaECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2006 99
Chart 10









































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Millions
EFTPOS Credit
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia
 100 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Intranetwork competition. Both the acquiring and issuing sides of
the card market appear to be competitive in Australia.
While the acquiring market is highly concentrated, a large portion
of recent interchange fee reductions has been passed through to lower
merchant service charges (MSC). The four largest banks in Australia
acquire about 95 percent of transaction volume and 85 percent of trans-
action value.
14 However, according to the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
average MSC for four-party networks in Australia has declined from
1.46 percent prior to regulation to 0.97 percent since regulation. This
roughly 50-basis-point decline is in line with the decline in interchange
fees pre and post regulation.
The four largest banks issue 55 percent of the number of cards and
account for 70 percent of transaction volume.
15 Although many banks
reportedly have cut reward-program benefits as a response to lower reg-
ulated interchange fees, they still provide rewards to their cardholders.
This may imply that a portion of interchange fee revenue remains
passed through to cardholders and that credit card issuing is competi-
tive. Also indicative of competition is the fact that two of the four
largest banks now issue and promote American Express cards as well as
Visa and MasterCard cards.
Regarding EFTPOS debit card issuing, the combined market share
of the four largest banks is large. Issuers typically charge per-transaction
fees to their cardholders after a certain number of free transactions.
Issuers seem to compete by using the per-transaction fees or free trans-
actions as their strategic tools.
Matching theory and practice. As suggested above, the Australian
payment card market probably can be characterized as exhibiting both
network and intranetwork competition. In light of this, which theoreti-
cal model(s) best “lines up” with Australian interchange fee practices?
None of the models appears to closely fit the Australian market over
a large number of parameters. For example, competition between Visa
and MasterCard, between Visa/MasterCard and Bankcard, and between
credit cards and EFTPOS can all be characterized as four-party scheme
network competition. Although the competition between Visa and
MasterCard can be regarded as identical, the other two competitive
relationships cannot. A number of important papers adopt four-party
schemes, but all of them assume either identical networks or symmetric
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network competition (Guthrie and Wright 2003, 2006; Rochet and
Tirole 2002, 2003). Chakravorti and Roson (2006) assume asymmetric
network competition but they adopt either a three-party scheme or an
issuer-controlled four-party scheme. EFTPOS cannot be regarded as
issuer-controlled because interchange fees flow from issuers to acquirers
in this market.
16 And most important, of course, interchange fees are
now regulated in Australia, which likely has fundamentally changed
pricing dynamics. This “new regime” must be taken into account in
analyzing current Australian conditions.
Other factors to consider in addressing the Australian situation
include differences in acquirer and issuer margins, merchant strategy,
consumer cardholding, and surcharging. Acquirers appear to maintain a
constant margin regardless of interchange fee levels, while issuers’
margins appear to be influenced by the level of interchange fees. Most
models assume constant margins on both sides of the market; only
Wright (2004) considers interchange fee pass-through.
Regarding merchant strategy, it is generally believed that the Aus-
tralian retail industry is more concentrated than that in the United
States. It is unclear, however, how competitive Australian merchants are
in practice. Merchants likely have a strategic motive to accept cards.
Unlike in the United States, each network sets a single interchange fee
for a typical point-of-sale transaction—that is, interchange fees do not
vary by industry. This implies that heterogeneous merchants face a
single interchange fee, consistent with Guthrie and Wright (2003,
2006); Rochet and Tirole (2003); Chakravorti and Roson (2006),
Schmalensee (2002); and Wright (2004). Consumers typically pay an
annual fee for credit cards with an interest-free period. To join a reward
program, an additional annual fee is charged. Such endogenous card-
holding with a fixed cost is assumed by Chakravorti and Roson (2006),
Katz (2001), and Wright (2003).
Merchants were not allowed to surcharge prior to credit card
reform. Since then, surcharging has been permitted, but few merchants
reportedly have elected to do so. According to a recent survey, however,
nearly half of Australia’s merchants plan to apply surcharges to credit
card transactions in 2006.
17 To sufficiently capture developments in the
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Australian payment card market, future models will probably need to
explicitly assume the option of merchant surcharging as well as inter-
change caps for four-party schemes.
United Kingdom
Network competition. It is unclear to what extent network competi-
tion exists in the UK. Whether the two dominant networks, Visa and
MasterCard, compete against each other in both credit and debit
markets, in just one market (likely debit), or whether Visa focuses on
credit and MasterCard focuses on debit, is an open question.
There are five credit card networks in the country. The two largest,
Visa and MasterCard, together have a more than 90 percent market
share.
18 In addition, the number of Visa and MasterCard credit/charge
cards has been increasing in recent years, while the sum of those of
other networks (American Express, Diners, and JCB) has not. Purchase
values show the same trend (Chart 11).
In the debit card market, the two networks, Visa and MasterCard,
have essentially equal (50-50) market shares (Chart 12). A typical UK
bank is a member of both the Visa and MasterCard networks, but in
issuing debit cards banks choose one brand or the other. According to
Cruickshank (2000), Switch’s (now MasterCard) interchange fee was
considerably lower than Visa’s in 2000, suggesting that, on revenue
grounds, Visa would be more attractive. However, potentially offsetting
this is the fact that MasterCard’s debit card, Maestro, is more popular
throughout Europe.
Two other facts make the UK card market interesting. First, unlike
in most other European countries, debit cards have not markedly out-
stripped credit cards in terms of usage (Chart 13). Second, unlike in
Australia, credit card-debit card network competition is subtle, if it
exists at all, because there is no third network equivalent to EFTPOS.
Intranetwork competition. Both the acquiring and issuing sides of
the card market are competitive in the UK.
The acquiring market is relatively concentrated. In 2002, the top
two acquirers had 40 percent and 30 percent market shares, respec-
tively. However, it is likely that the market share of the top three
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Chart 11
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acquirers has declined recently, and the difference between MSCs and
interchange fees in the UK is comparable to the average difference in
the United States.
19
The issuing market is clearly competitive. With respect to credit
cards, no annual fees, free or low introductory interest periods, and cash
rebates are broadly used. In addition, several U.S. issuers, including
Capital One, Citibank, and MBNA, have entered the UK market in
recent years, and their combined market share now accounts for 20
percent of credit cards issued. Smaller UK banks have also entered the
market. With respect to debit cards, banks’ debit card market shares
correspond closely with the current account market shares.
Matching theory and practice. As noted above, the degree of network
competition in the UK is difficult to gauge. Intranetwork competition,
on the other hand, exists.
To the extent Visa and MasterCard compete in the credit card
market, it can be characterized as an identical four-party scheme
(Guthrie and Wright 2003, 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2002, 2003). To
the extent Visa and MasterCard compete in the debit card market,
competition is again four-party, but it may or may not be identical
network competition. According to Cruickshank (2000), Visa debit
and Switch (MasterCard) interchange fees were quite different in 1998:
The Visa debit interchange fee was at least twice as much as the Switch
interchange fee. However, the more recent European Payment Cards
Yearbook (2004-05) reports that the average interchange fee on Visa
debit is thought to have fallen sharply from the figure reported in
Cruickshank (2000). Depending on how close the two networks’ inter-
change fees now are, they may be regarded as almost identical. If they
are not identical, Chakravorti and Roson’s (2006) asymmetric network
competition model may fit well. Although their model assumes a three-
party scheme, it can also accommodate an issuer-controlled four-party
network. Since Visa debit issuers typically are not Switch issuers, an
issuer-controlled four-party assumption may be valid.
In terms of intranetwork competition, it is hard to judge which side
is more competitive or which side receives higher margins. However, in
the UK, all networks are still subject to so-called “net issuer rules”—
only issuers can be acquirers. In addition, many aspects of merchant
acquiring, such as transaction processing and recruitment of retailers,
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are outsourced to third-party service providers who do not have voting
power. Therefore, a network’s objective is likely to be weighted more on
the issuer side. As a result, maximizing members’ (weighted) joint
profits (with a higher weight on the issuers), maximizing the number of
transactions, or maximizing a weighted sum of end-user surplus (with a
higher weight on the consumer side) is a plausible assumption. These
assumptions are made in Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006) and Rochet
and Tirole (2002, 2003), with network competition; and in Rochet and
Tirole (2002), Wright (2003, 2004), Schwartz and Vincent (2006), and
Schmalensee (2002), without network competition.
There are additional factors to consider as well. One, although the
degree of competition among merchants is unknown, merchants likely
have a strategic motive to accept cards. If they did not have such a
motive, they may not have complained about credit card interchange
fees to the Office of Fair Trading in the early 1990s. Two, credit and
debit card interchange fee schedules are not publicly available. However,
according to Cruickshank (2000), credit card interchange fees vary
according to a number of factors, including whether a transaction is
domestic or cross-border, whether it is a face-to-face or a mail order
transaction, and on the level of information about the transaction that
is provided to the issuer. Visa’s pricing in the UK may therefore be
somewhat similar to Visa’s pricing for EU cross-border transactions and,
unlike in the United States, a single rate may typically apply to retail
Point of Sale (POS) transactions in the UK. This implies that heteroge-
neous merchants largely face a single interchange fee, as assumed by
Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Chakra-
vorti and Roson (2006), Schmalensee (2002), and Wright (2004). 
In addition, there are consumer factors to consider. Consumers can
hold credit cards with no annual fees, so endogenous cardholding with
no fixed fees might be an apt description in the UK credit card market
(Guthrie and Wright 2003, 2006; Gans and King 2002). On the other
hand, since the debit card is a demand deposit account product, debit
card holding might be exogenous.
There are other factors to consider as well. UK merchants are pro-
hibited from surcharging debit card transactions, but they are permitted
to surcharge credit card transactions. However, most merchants choose
not to surcharge for credit card transactions; surcharging may require
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some costs to merchants. Thus, interchange fees are not neutral, unlike
the Gans and King (2002) prediction. 
On balance, the assumptions in Guthrie and Wright (2003, 2006)
appear to fit UK payment markets well if Visa and MasterCard
compete against one another. The model predicts that with competition
among heterogeneous merchants, network competition may raise inter-
change fees if networks place more weight on consumer surplus than on
merchant surplus. Since credit card reward programs are very popular in
the UK, consumer surplus is likely weighted more heavily than mer-
chant surplus. However, unlike the model’s prediction, UK credit card
interchange fees have been declining. The decline in interchange fees
may not be a result of market equilibrium but may be due instead to
regulatory pressure from the Office of Fair Trading.
If, on the other hand, Visa and MasterCard do not compete in the
UK, assumptions in Rochet and Tirole (2002) may fit well with the UK
debit card market and assumptions in Wright (2004) may fit well with
the UK credit card market. While credit card interchange fees likely
have been lowered because of regulatory pressure, debit card inter-
change fees have not been subject to regulatory concerns. As Rochet
and Tirole (2002) predicted, debit card issuers’ competition may have
lowered interchange fees of Visa debit.
IV. SUMMARY
This article has sought to provide a bridge between the theoretical
and empirical literatures on interchange fees. Specifically, the article
confronts theory with practice by asking: To what extent do existing
models of interchange fees match actual interchange fee practices in
various countries? For each of three countries—Australia, the UK, and
the United States—models that “best” fit the competitive and institu-
tional features of that country’s payment card market are identified, and
the implications of those model are compared to actual practices. 
Not surprisingly, the models examined—while certainly yielding
insight into developments in these countries—are limited in their appli-
cability and predictive power. This reflects the fact that country-specific
factors are typically very important. The next step, of course, is to try to
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gather comprehensive data that capture these institutional features as
well as interchange structures and prices, so that analysts can conduct
rigorous econometric analysis.
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ENDNOTES
1In Australia, interchange fees of EFTPOS, a domestic PIN-based debit card
scheme, go in the opposite direction. 
2Weiner and Wright (2005).
3Before the so-called Wal-Mart settlement, the HAC rule in the United
States required merchants who accept a network’s credit card to also accept that
network’s signature-based debit cards. Currently, networks require merchants to
accept both consumer and corporate cards and accept both nonreward and
reward cards.
4Other surveys are provided by Schmalensee (2003), Evans and Schmalensee
(2006), Roson (2005), and Weiner and Wright (2005).
5For discussion of PIN vs. signature debit competition, see Hayashi and
others (2003).
6According to the Star’s fee structure, a processing fee is around 3 cents per
transaction and according to the FMI, the acquirer’s processing charge is between
2.5 cents to 6.5 cents per transactions, these fees have declined slightly in the last
several years. 
7A typical merchant fee consists of three components, an interchange fee (to
the issuer), a processing fee (to the acquirer), and a switch fee (to the network).
8According to a large credit card issuer’s annual report, the average growth
rate of interchange fee income (after deducted the costs of reward program)
exceeds the average growth rate of transaction value. This suggests that inter-
change fee does not pass-through 100 percent on issuing side.
9According to the BIS, the number of debit cards and credit cards issued in
the U.S. in 2002 were 260.4 million and 709 million, respectively. The U.S. pop-
ulation in the same year was 288.2 million. 
10Some studies pointed this out. For example, the 2004 Preferred Card Study
by Edgar, Dunn, and Company concluded that “rewards dominate the reasons to
use a specific credit card for 6 in 10 Americans.”
11See, for example, Hayashi (2006) for the trends of U.S. interchange fees. 
12This is very likely. Some issuers outsource their reward program adminis-
tration to third-party service providers.
13Building Society Comments on RBA Draft Standards for Visa Debit and EFT-
POS (April 29, 2005).
14Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (2000)
15Authors’ calculation from Nilson Report. 
16On the other hand, competition between four-party scheme and three-
party scheme may fit well with Manenti and Somma (2002).
17See, for example, American Banker vol. 170, no. 148.
18European Payment Cards Yearbook (2004-05). 
19According to the 2002 MSC Survey by Payment Systems Europe Ltd, average
credit card MSC in UK has been stable around 1.5-1.6 percent from 1995 to 2002.
According to Cruickshank (2000), average credit card interchange fee was 1-1.1
percent. In the United States, average MasterCard and Visa credit card MSC is
reportedly around 2 percent and average interchange fees are around 1.5 percent. 
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